How Far the US Went to Rescue Hostage Bowe Bergdahl

Sasha Ingber: Welcome to Spycast, the official podcast of the International Spy Museum. I'm your host, Sasha Ingber, and each week I take you into the shadows of espionage, intelligence, and covert operations across the globe in 2009. Bowe Bergdahl walked away from his army post in eastern Afghanistan only to be abducted and held hostage until 2014.

He was captured by the Taliban and then handed to the Haqqani network, an aligned terrorist group, and US officials said they kept Bergdahl in a metal cage in total darkness after he tried to escape. By 2012, the US government was turning to Tony Shaffer for help. The retired military intelligence officer had directed several special mission task forces that conducted black operations.

Now, Tony was asked to create a track two non-official scheme to help secure Bergdahl's release, a ploy that pulled in Congress, back channels in Pakistani intelligence, and British and American media outlets. Here's Tony.

Tony, welcome. Thank you for coming. 

Tony Shaffer: Good to be here. Thanks for having me. 

Sasha Ingber: So you're retired and how do you get linked up with Bowe Bergdahl’s abduction? 

Tony Shaffer: So as you guys probably know from being at the Spy Museum, we never really retired. It's kinda like being in the mafia. They always call you back when they want something, and that's what happened here. So I was driving down, uh, Constitution Avenue and I get a call from a number, we'll just leave it at an unlisted number.

And, uh, the question was, Hey, uh, could you, we need to talk to you on a secure line. Can you get to a secure line? And my answer was like, well, you know, I don't have a clearance. Like, come on, we know you can get to a secure line. Get to the secure line, now we need to talk to you. It's like, okay. So, um. I did what I was asked to do by this organization that will remain nameless, but people can probably figure it out from listening to what we're talking about.

I go to where I have access, believe it or not, to the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve actually has a SCIF, Secure Information Facility in their printing room. And I'm not joking, it's like, it was like out of a movie, you have to get into the building, which I had clearance to get into. And they walk you down this long hall of all these printing machines, literally, and you'd think you're in the, in the basement of some industrial building.

And next thing you know, there's a little a door to the left, you get into and there's this whole command center. And so I get in there and I say, look, uh, I gotta take a secure call. And they say, sure, 

Sasha Ingber: had you ever taken a call in this printing room SCIF?

Tony Shaffer: maybe. 

Sasha Ingber: So what did they say? 

Tony Shaffer: So I get the call and I get on the phone with their point of contact and they said, do you know anything about Bowe Bergdahl?

And it's like, not really. I mean, I know he had walked away from his post in Afghanistan. There was a big search for him, but it's not something I'm really paying attention to. And the next question was very telling. It's like, how long would it take for you to get in touch with Hamid Gul? Um, I don't know, probably about two days.

Sasha Ingber: This is a three star general who had served as the head of Pakistani's Interservices Intelligence. ISI. 

Tony Shaffer: Right. 

Sasha Ingber: In the 1980s. So before we get to who he is, do you have any idea what you're getting roped into at this point? 

Tony Shaffer: None whatsoever. I mean, zero clue, nothing. There was a whole range of things which, um, had popped up that were of interest and the notable feature of just being an intelligence officer.

It's kind of interesting when people recognize the skillset and they want you to use it for a certain purpose, and this was kind of that. It's just outta the blue. Can you do something to help us? And that's where this started. 

Sasha Ingber: And there's a little bit of irony here because you had been in Washington DC to deal with access to classified information if, if I'm remembering this correctly.

Tony Shaffer: So yeah, it's an interesting irony. So as this developed, and I think it's great to bring this up, we were in a legal battle at the time regarding Operation Dark Heart. There was uh, over 256 redactions of my memoir, Operation Dark Heart, Special Operations on the front line of Afghanistan and the path to victory.

And we were in a legal battle. You know, that came out in 2010. This is now 2012. And one of the grand ironies is that during the time we were fighting in court, later the same day, I'm in this secure facility talking to special, these, these special operations folks over top secret, clearly off the books operations that we didn't want to acknowledge.

So it was a grand irony that in one case, they're trying to prevent me from having access to my book and classified information. At the same time I'm actually executing an off the books, highly classified operation. It's one of those things that could only happen in Washington. 

Sasha Ingber: It could only happen in Washington.

That's right. Or in the movies. So let's talk about General Gul. Why is it that you're now being asked to contact him? Why would he hold the cards instead of the current ISI director? 

Tony Shaffer: That's an excellent question. So there are two reasons I've, I eventually learned about. First, I did know at the time that he was the father of the, the Taliban.

Basically, it was his efforts in the eighties to create the Mujahideen that we'd worked with. We, department of Defense and CIA, to push back against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. 

Sasha Ingber: And he actually worked with the CIA to push the Soviets out of Afghanistan. 

Tony Shaffer: Absolutely. He was part of the team.

But as a, uh, consequence of that, the Taliban sprang up and became something of a, uh, issue for both countries. The, the Haqqani Network was one of those networks, which we believed, and I've seen nothing to counter my belief that we're wholly a wholly owned subsidiary of the Pakistani intelligence service still to this day, by the way. So it turned out while I didn't know at the moment of the question, how long will it take for you to get a hold of, of Hamid Gul, the, the rationale was by the folks who asked me to run the op is we think he has more influence then the current ISI over Haqqani, that was the thinking.

Sasha Ingber: Now, this is not only a person who had worked with the United States, but then did become disillusioned with it. 

Tony Shaffer: He did. 

Sasha Ingber: And he was said to have warned the Taliban when there were, uh, missile launches. 

Tony Shaffer: Exactly.

Sasha Ingber: Targeting the Taliban. So what was the logic in thinking that this man would prove useful in securing Bergdahl's release 

Tony Shaffer: money.

So Hammid and I were friendly in the fact that we'd, uh, been on BBC talking about the war having served in Afghanistan when the powers that be here in Washington decided we wanted to have this potential for an off the books, under the radar contact. They knew I, they knew I knew him. And they basically, the question was, how long will it take for you to get in touch with him?

And it was two days. 

Sasha Ingber: So if it takes two days, how do you end up getting in touch with him? 

Tony Shaffer: So there was a network that still exists within, um, the United Kingdom with the, the British that basically, um, help the Pakistani intelligence service. So I went through my contacts in England to say, look, uh, we'd like to have informal contact with Hamid Gul.

And they said, yeah, that's, that's fine. And they gave me his phone number and said, you can reach out directly. 

Sasha Ingber: So what was the pretext of the call? And then what was that? 

Tony Shaffer: Good question. 

Sasha Ingber: What was that first call like? 

Tony Shaffer: So, um, the tribal area was the context. So as you probably still know, there's a, right now as we speak, as we're taping, there's some friction between the Pakistanis and Afghanis.

Sasha Ingber: Just a little. 

Tony Shaffer: Just a little. There's a common, almost a war there. And so it's all about that. 

Sasha Ingber: Pakistanis have been launching missiles into Afghanistan. 

Tony Shaffer: Yeah, so it's about this tribal area. So one of the things. The, the reason was perfectly logical. I want to talk to Hamid about some potential economic development concepts that would maybe bring stabilization to the, uh, the ungoverned area, and that was the premise for the call.

Sasha Ingber: Okay, so the, the phone's ringing, General Gul picks up then what? 

Tony Shaffer: So General Gul was open to the conversation and we hinted during the first phone call that there was issues we'd like to meet regarding certain good faith options we'd like to look at. And without getting into detail, we kind of hinted, I kind of hinted that the Bergdahl should be something we'd wanna talk about, and he was open to that.

Sasha Ingber: So tell me more about what he was like because I know that he died, he had a, a brain hemorrhage at the time. 

Tony Shaffer: He was of, uh, extraordinarily sound body and mind, and he was very, uh, irascible. He's like any other retired general who has an attitude. He had an attitude and that's okay. He knew who I was, so he knew that, that when I contacted him, it wasn't just some other think tank guy and he knew that this was a call about something else.

It wasn't so much about economic development, but he played along. I mean, spies kind of know when you're talking about secondary issues, which are going to be the primary thing you get to eventually. 

Sasha Ingber: So he's motivated by money. 

Tony Shaffer: Absolutely. 

Sasha Ingber: He's reading between the lines. 

Tony Shaffer: Absolutely. 

Sasha Ingber: And are you pulling in members of Congress under the guise of economic development in these Tribal regions.

Tony Shaffer: I did.

I didn't know. Yeah, I did. And they didn't know it. So, so as we start developing this as any good operation, you're gonna have to have a, a substantial and cohesive and believable cover story. So. One of the first places I go is to my friend Walter Jones, representative Walter Jones, God rest his soul.

One of my friends and mentors. He was a representative from North Carolina and um, I'd been working with him and I said in a meeting, it's like, wouldn't it be nice? Wouldn't it be nice Congressman? Wouldn't it be nice Walter, if we set up a track two? Pakistan so we can kind of open and open this, uh, informal negotiation and try to take the heat off the administration.

And Walter agreed. It's like, that's a great idea. Why don't we do that? And next thing you know, we gotta cover working in, in real time as the primary effort of being economic discussions with the country of Pakistan, with members of Congress and former military folks. 

Sasha Ingber: Okay, so let's just pause for a second.

Tony Shaffer: Sure. 

Sasha Ingber: How common is it to bring in unwitting members of Congress? Our diplomatic core, members of our military? They have no idea that they are being used. Is that something that happens more often than we realize in intelligence operations? 

Tony Shaffer: Probably. I have to.

Sasha Ingber: so anytime someone says, I have a good idea, 

Tony Shaffer: well there's, this town is full of good idea merchants.

Don't get me wrong. I mean, you can't swing a dead cat in this town without hitting a good idea merchant. What, what makes good ideas, good ideas, which you're actually actionable, is having an understanding of the environment and people. So in this case, it just so happened I had the right ingredients to put together the team that was necessary to be the, the overt cover for the operation.

Sasha Ingber: So while these economic development efforts are underway. 

Tony Shaffer: Yeah. 

Sasha Ingber: How did you start trying to negotiate for Bergdahl? Did you hear the general making any, um, any subtle demands? Was he showing any cards here? 

Tony Shaffer: So, yeah, let me go into the shape of the operation. I think that the shape will help you understand the answer to your question.

When we did this, we did it as a think tank. It was a center for Advanced Defense studies, which is still here in Washington. Uh, they didn't know we were doing it either at the time, but they do know, they do know it's okay Dave. It was all is forgiven anyway. Um, and we did it in such a way that we engaged a, a big government contractor. I don't wanna say the name 'cause they may get upset about it too. And, and they were a partner in this too. 

Sasha Ingber: I'm noticing a trend, Tony. Well, but I digress. 

Tony Shaffer: Most the, the, the, the big government contractor kind of knew what was going on. Just saying. So 

Sasha Ingber: I'm never getting coffee with you for the record. But, okay. So you brought them in. 

Tony Shaffer: This was a tapestry of, of, of individuals and organizations that would offer up a legitimate, and by the way. Who could argue with the idea of actually trying to find a path to economic development to bring stability to the, to the, uh, ungoverned zone.

It was a good idea. And so the cover actually took on a life of its own, which is a good thing. Uh, uh, nobody would ever want to, to stand in the way of actually doing this. So the tapestry of the cover was actually completely legitimate and actually functioned to, to create the conditions for the negotiation.

So this was an extensive effort that that people had to understand, look, I'm doing this economic development, but the real issue is Bowe Bergdahl. And that's how it started. And so we started recognizing as we were building this, that we had space and time to do the informal discussions with Hamid and, and the crew.

So we started hinting pretty early on, there's gonna be money involved and this is what we think you'd be willing to take. So we were able to figure out through these informal contacts that they were going to be willing to be paid about $10 million to convince the Haqqani network to release Bowe Bergdahl.

And then we had a scheme to go get him and everything in, in addition to that, if that was going to work. So we had to start preparing for face-to-face negotiations. 

Sasha Ingber: So let's turn to Bergdahl specifically. 

Tony Shaffer: Sure.

Sasha Ingber: I assume that his desertion from his battalion doesn't influence the actual intensity of the negotiation.

I'd like you to confirm that. And number two, did it affect how valuable he was perceived to be by the Haqqanis because he is labeled a deserter 

Tony Shaffer: the first part. Did his attitude affect. Um, our effort to, to return him. No. I've been heavily criticized by a number of folks because I did this during the Obama administration.

I'm a spy. My job is to protect and defend our country, and if the people in charge say we want him back, my job is to help get him back. Second part of the question, the Pakistani intelligence service were militarily centric. I think they recognized that, that he was a resource worth exploring and I think frankly, whoever, whoever sent me off on this analyzed correctly what the ISI was interpreting regarding his value. 

Sasha Ingber: Okay. So now it's January of 2013. 

Tony Shaffer: Yeah. 

Sasha Ingber: You're planning to meet General Gul in London. 

Tony Shaffer: Yeah. 

Sasha Ingber: Can you tell me about some of the work on the backend to make the meeting happen? 

Tony Shaffer: So, General Gul had upset the British to be polite, and so I had to go meet with members of Parliament. 

Sasha Ingber: What did he do? 

Tony Shaffer: Well, it had to do with, I don't know, financial schemes, which really, you know, or maybe illegal. I didn't want to get into it, to be honest with you. It's like whatever he did, I don't want to know. 

Sasha Ingber: There's a little bit of a don't ask, don't tell situation here.

Tony Shaffer: There was, yeah, definitely. And there was essentially a warrant out to arrest him in England. So it's like, hey, uh, could we get that warrant kind of set aside. 'cause I'd offered to go other places to negotiate face to face, and I'd offered to go to Pakistan. It's like, no, under no conditions are you going to Pakistan.

It's like, yeah. So I was that crazy. I would've gone anyway. They said, no, no, no. We have to pick a third spot that we feel that it'll be sufficiently neutral for both sides to sit down and have a, a worthwhile and detailed conversation. So England, London was the place that we picked for that. 

Sasha Ingber: Are the Brits amenable to your saying, Hey, this person who is basically persona non grata in your country, we would like to bring him here.

Tony Shaffer: Well, the British members of Parliament were going to be willing to use their authority to talk to the British authorities. So the answer is, yeah, I think there was sufficient interest in, in cooperating on this.

Sasha Ingber: Under the guise of economic development? 

Tony Shaffer: That's correct. 

Sasha Ingber: In the tribal areas? 

Tony Shaffer: That's correct, yes.

Sasha Ingber: Okay. 

Tony Shaffer: Yes. The cover was used for purposes of getting General Gul to England. Yes, that's that's correct. And during the time I was in England, we used, uh, the cover for me being there to do all this, was the production of a pilot for travel channel called Spy’s Eye.

Tony Shaffer: “London is one of the world's truly great cities, a dream location for tourists from around the world. I'm gonna show you a different side of London. A secret side of espionage and intrigue that most people never know exists.”

Sasha Ingber: And so this you tell me is your Argo moment. 

Tony Shaffer: It is our Argo moment. 

Sasha Ingber: This is a reference of course, to the fake film that was used to rescue American diplomats who were hiding out in Revolutionary Iran.

Except we're not talking about a fake film production. We are talking about a real TV show. 

Tony Shaffer: It's, it's available on the internet right now. It was a pilot that, uh, we were paid to, to film in London. I, by the way, I think it's a great series. Just I'm gonna pick it up. 

Sasha Ingber: Well, you're biased. 

Tony Shaffer: I am biased.

I'm the star. So, of course. So we filmed Spy’s Eye in the all around London. And during that time we were, I was having time to meet with our Pakistani intelligence contacts to start the negotiations, the earnest negotiations for Bowe Bergdahl. That's where the real negotiation started. 

Sasha Ingber: So let me wrap my head around this.

Tony Shaffer: Yeah, 

Sasha Ingber: you are, I don't know if you are in a studio, if you're sitting in a restaurant eating fish and chips, if there's, you know, a producer around, how is this all 

Tony Shaffer: all that. 

Sasha Ingber: Taking place. 

Tony Shaffer: It was happening right there on with the crew. We actually had producers, we had actors, we had the crew. This was like a dozen people.

Sasha Ingber: Were any of the cast or the crew aware 

Tony Shaffer: they had no idea. No. We, it's a running joke now. Anytime I talked to 'em, it's, it's like they had no idea what we were doing, what I was doing on the side. 

Sasha Ingber: So what were these conversations? That you were having, and how could you coordinate both at the same time? 

Tony Shaffer: Well, again, it's, it's all about trying to create the perception of cooperation between some of these folks and the negotiations.

You could have stood right next to me during this session and you would've never known I was negotiating with Pakistani intelligence guys for the release of Bowe Bergdahl because we, we, we knew what we were talking about, but for the third party, just observing would've had no clue, would've had no clue that we were actually negotiating about trying to get Bowe Bergdahl back and, and talking about what prices were gonna be willing to do.

It was all hidden kind of in, in, uh, open text language. 

Sasha Ingber: Did any of that audio make it onto the actual series? 

Tony Shaffer: Uh, maybe you have to go look. This is, I think, a good example of kind of, you know, everything coming together for a little microcosm of, of what Argo did.

Sasha Ingber: Right so we're in sort of like life imitates art and art imitates art and art imitates life spiral.

Tony Shaffer: Yeah pretty much

Sasha Ingber: Did progress get made? In trying to get Bergdahl out? 

Tony Shaffer: Absolutely. So after our Argo moment, we figured out after the fact, based on some other intel, which I don't wanna get into how we knew, that they were gonna, at the last minute ask for double, they were gonna ask for like $20 million instead of $10 million 

Sasha Ingber: when you're going through the airport in London.

Heathrow. Yeah. Um, when you're leaving, are you thinking to yourself. What is happening here? How have I spent all this time? What's going through your head as these days are going by and you're meeting with the former head of Pakistani intelligence and having all of these interactions with other people, 

Tony Shaffer: it's another day in the office.

No, I mean for anybody who reads my Intel bio, it's my retirement bio, goes through and talks about this. I mean, I ran the first undercover cyber unit back in the nineties before anybody figured it out. I've been working high level operations where I debrief for the White House on a regular basis. So to me, this is just another operation that I wanted to see successful. That's it. 

Sasha Ingber: What is the US government officially doing to try to get Bergdahl out? 

Tony Shaffer: I was aware of everything because there were multiple efforts the military was doing. Any number of operations regarding, uh trying to con consider doing raids to go grab him 

Sasha Ingber: When we come back Tony explains how the promising negotiations for Bergdahl's release totally fall apart. 

All right, so now we're in 2014. The London meeting happened. How close do you feel you are to actually securing Bergdahl's release? You have this information, they're gonna ask for 20 million. Are you getting close? 

Tony Shaffer: Yeah. We, we had already gotten that all cleared. The, the issue really became more of policy than capacity. So I think people on our side were convinced this would work. The the intelligence and other folks who would have to action this part of the concept, believe it or not, was pay the money. And then I'll just tell you what the plan was to basically have the Haqqani network release Bergdahl to the ISI.

'cause the ISI, those guys the same, it's like the retired guys and their active guys. They're kind of interchangeable, so, so the plan was then once that the Pakistani ISI had taken charge of him from the Haqqani network to move Bergdahl to a southern port city in Pakistan, where the special operations guys would do a raid to capture him.

So basically what I did, what we did, would've never been known and that's basically what I really wish would've happened. They, they would've done this heroic, uh, nabbing of Bergdahl and everything would've been back to normal. 

Sasha Ingber: Now, I know you say that this is what you wished had happened. Yeah.

President Obama chose a different track.

Tony Shaffer: He did. 

Sasha Ingber: Before we talk about what he chose, how did you find out that this was not going to go the way that you had thought it would? 

Tony Shaffer: So I get a call and I am requested by two of the intelligence officers from the three letter agency to come meet to talk about the operation.

And so, uh, we picked Joe Theismann's down in Old Town, Alexandria, right next to the Metro. And we get a booth sit down and they say, we've got some bad news. We're not going to be able to go with your option, and it's like what? We have just put together a massive effort. Massive. I mean, they, and they were aware of every, every component that was involved because of the senior officers.

I had to read into it and it's like, yeah, there's a decision that we're not going to do this. 

Sasha Ingber: So, I mean, when you hear that, how, how difficult is it to shut your operation down from a functional standpoint? And also

Tony Shaffer: , good question

Sasha Ingber: emotionally. Well, 'cause you've been so invested in this. 

Tony Shaffer: Yeah. Emotionally it's kinda like, as a professional, it's like you're kind of like, seriously, after all this work, you're just gonna walk away.

And this happens more than people understand. I mean, it's like, okay, you know, fine. The, the, the turning it off. Because of the momentum of, of the cover was a completely different issue. It's like this thing has a mind of its own now because there were still negotiations and meetings at the Pakistani embassy and in New York.

I was actually meeting with the Pakistani diplomats in Manhattan over some of this stuff. 

Sasha Ingber: This when you were like, I got food poisoning. I'm sorry, I can't make that meeting. 

Tony Shaffer: No, no, no. We continued. No, I, I was authorized to make whatever 'cause it is a think tank thing. So, you know, I'm just doing think tank stuff.

You can't, and that's one of the notable things I think most intelligent, you can't just be, have alerting behavior and say, oh, okay things. No, no. You had to continue with the momentum, with the cover no matter what. And which we did, by the way. And, um, notably that night, because I was, I wasn't pleased. I'm not gonna say, say, there was no reaction, there was, I sent a screamer off to the commander of ISAF, the commander, the commanding general of, of our forces in Afghanistan saying.

What the hell's going on? And I figure he, since he's the guy in charge of the war, would know, and he basically came back and said, I ha I can't change this. Which was an odd answer from the guy in charge. So if the guy in charge who's a four star general tells me he can't influence this, then there's something else going on.

Sasha Ingber: So Obama makes this calculation. 

Tony Shaffer: He does. 

Sasha Ingber: He had wanted to shut down Guantanamo Bay. He had campaigned on that. And instead of just paying 10 or 20 million for Bergdahl, uh, he decides that he can kill two birds with one stone or more birds in that he can switch these Taliban detainees, get them out of Gitmo, get Bergdahl back.

Tony Shaffer: Yeah. 

Sasha Ingber: Um. Today as we sit here in 2026, Guantanamo Bay remains open. The Haqqani aligned Taliban are still holding people hostage. 

Tony Shaffer: They are. 

Sasha Ingber: What did you think of this deal and has your view on it changed? 

Tony Shaffer: It's a great question and I'm gonna give you a bit of a complex answer. So. The, the exchange happened, the five Taliban for Bergdahl.

The problem is this, there was only going to be four of the Taliban released. They had to add the fifth guy, the Haqqani guy, because they had intended to include a Haqqani guy. So that's how bad this deal was, is like they didn't even recognize like, no, no, no. The Taliban element holding Bergdahl doesn't care about these other four guys.

They care about this one Haqqani guy. So they had to add the fifth guy at the end. But to your point, the policy was we need to clear out Gitmo of all the Taliban. So I thought it was a horrible decision, one which didn't actually get us anywhere and during, and we were still at war with the Taliban, so I thought it was a bad move.

I never supported it. I thought it was a mistake. I'll say this too, at the end, the commander of ISAF. The, the commanding general of ISAF who was a general of Joseph Dunford Marine Corps General Joe Dunford. Uh, he came back after he left Afghanistan and he became commander of the Marine Corps. And we had a meeting, uh, for a number of reasons in his office.

And at the very end of our meeting at the Pentagon when he was back, he stopped and said, Tony, I gotta tell you something. And I said, what's that? He says, I didn't know. He's like, what do you mean you didn't know? He says, they didn't tell me. I didn't know till after the fact that they were gonna swap the five Taliban for Bergdahl.

Sasha Ingber: Was that for operational security? 

Tony Shaffer: No, that was for political reasons because the, the man in charge of the war should always know whatever's happening. And if you remember, the exchange of Bergdahl happened, uh, where we had to go into Pakistan with this special operations helicopter to grab him. So it was notable that the commanding General was not told about the political deal.

Sasha Ingber: Hmm. 

Tony Shaffer: Yeah. 

Sasha Ingber: And what happened to Bergdahl? 

Tony Shaffer: So, um, interesting question. Uh, he's now pretty much a free man. He was eventually cleared in federal court of allegations of desertion. General Mark Millie, who was formerly, uh, chairman of the Joint Chiefs under President Trump. Prior to that, the Chief of Staff of the Army, where I had contact with him before that he was commander of Forces Command and he was the general who made the decision when he'd been returned to charge him with desertion, which by the way, he was charged with desertion, tried under the UCMJ, Uniform Code of Military Justice and found guilty of desertion.

Sasha Ingber: So, have you had any conversation with Bergdahl since this happened? 

Tony Shaffer: No. 

Sasha Ingber: Does he even know that you were doing this? 

Tony Shaffer: Probably not. I mean, other than there was some hearings on this after the fact, if he had actually paid attention. Some of this came up directly during hearings regarding the whole Bergdahl issue.

Sasha Ingber: So let's go back to Capitol Hill now. Members of Congress. How did they respond? 

Tony Shaffer: A little bit of shock. I had to go back and apologize, but I always pointed out it's like, look, my job is to do things which are necessary for the purposes of intelligence collection and, and special operations. I came totally clean.

It's like this is something we were trying to do for the purposes of quietly getting him back without any drama. And, uh, everybody I spoke to was, was just, was just fine with it. A little bit surprised, but, you know, I don't think they were entirely surprised based on what I did for a living and what I do for a living.

So 

Sasha Ingber: why did you have to tell them? 

Tony Shaffer: I felt ethically I had to do that these people are, were close friends and mentors and, and, uh, they still are. I can say nobody was upset. Which I was very pleased with. 

Sasha Ingber: Are there aspects of what you learned then that would be useful in hostage negotiations today? Um, when we speak specifically of the Taliban, they're still holding Americans.

And I wanna take a moment to say who they are. Mahmood Habibi. He was arrested by the Taliban after a drone strike killed Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri. He's been held since August of 2022. Denied access to American diplomats, communication with his wife, with his daughter. Does what you went through provide any lesson that can be useful in negotiations here? 

Tony Shaffer: Yes and no. So the first lesson about the Taliban is they're a tapestry. The Taliban is not a, a monolithic organization. You just can't go to one guy and say, oh, he's the Taliban leader. Uh, we were doing a search for a number of Taliban leaders based on the fact that there was different factions and it, it often like we we talked about today regarding Haqqani. Haqqani is like a wholly owned subsidiary of, of the Pakistanian of, of Taliban. They're different than the Afghan and Taliban, so going to negotiate with Haqqani would mean nothing to the Taliban in Afghanistan. Holding an American citizen based on, on someone being killed by, you know, the Zawahiri. hit.

So the answer is, it, it depends because you have to understand the very fabric of the organization to be effective in dealing with the organization and that that's the first thing. Um, I would recommend those who are looking at this to actually figure out what the motivation is of those leaders and then act on that motivation.

Sometimes you can do it through money. Sometimes you can do it through intimidation, but you've gotta understand down to a very granular level of, of who the individuals are and what part of the Taliban is. 

Sasha Ingber: We also see that sometimes negotiations move slowly because of turf wars. 

Tony Shaffer: Oh yeah.

Sasha Ingber: Issues with communication.

Are there lessons there too? 

Tony Shaffer: Well. The fact that this operation took over, you know, two years to develop and run. Yeah, you have to be very patient and you can't always depend on people acting like you want them to act. You can't control people, places or things. That's one of the first things you learn as a, as a case officer, you can influence events, but those events can influence you as well.

So I think that's one of the lessons here. 

Sasha Ingber: I feel like any good therapist should be saying that. I wish my therapist told me that. Okay, last question, Tony. Let's say you get another phone call asking you if you can put, uh, the three letter agency in, in touch with somebody else, are you saying yes? 

Tony Shaffer: So I took the oath of office and the oath of office never expires.

So, you know, I think that my obligation is a, is a military intelligence, a military case officer is to always support. The, uh, the objectives of our nation. Some, even if I disagree with them at times. 

Sasha Ingber: A real pleasure speaking with you. 

Tony Shaffer: You too, ma'am. It's been great. 

Sasha Ingber: Thanks for listening to this episode of spycast.

If you like the episode, give us a follow on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts, and leave us a rating or review. It really helps. If you have any feedback or you wanna hear about a particular topic, you can reach us by email at spycast@spymuseum.org. I'm your host, Sasha Ingber, and the show is brought to you by N2K Networks, Goat Rodeo, and the International Spy Museum in Washington.